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Egypt’s Protracted Revolution
By Sahar F. Aziz*

E

Introduction

approval.7 Even if a bill became law, implementation was an
enormous hurdle because enforcement has always been a major
impediment to establishing rule of law in Egypt. So long as
holdover Mubarak officials controlled the bureaucracy and security forces, the few reform laws promulgated were as valueless
as the paper on which they were written.

gypt’s revolution did not end on February 11, 2011.
Despite the removal of Hosni Mubarak from the presidency, the former Mubarak regime remains entrenched
in Egypt’s economic and political system.1 This is evident from
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) June 2012
power grab of legislative authority after dissolving parliament
— a move many consider to have been a virtual military coup
d’etat.2 Skeptics argue SCAF is merely a Mubarak holdover
until the old regime can reinvent itself under a new guise.
Former Prime Minister and Mubarak confidant Ahmed Shafiq’s
near win against the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi
in the presidential elections may be proof of this.3 A Shafiq
presidency would have instantly nullified gains made through
the last eighteen months of protests, sacrifices, and deaths by
millions of Egyptians.

Although the current political landscape differs from the days
preceding the January 25 revolution, Egypt appears to suffer
from a familiar syndrome: for every step taken towards meaningful reform, it falls back two steps due to entrenched counterrevolutionary forces. This began the moment the military took
control of the executive branch on February 11, 2011 only to
unilaterally replace the 1971 constitution with its own interim
Constitutional Declaration on March 30, 2011.8 This dubious
document unilaterally imposed
by SCAF barely holds Egypt
together as the country faces one
legal crisis after another.

“Ironically, it is the same
instability initiated by
remnants of the Mubarak
regime that bootstraps them
back into political office.”

But today, even with a Morsi
victory, one is hard-pressed
to find significant changes to
Egypt’s political landscape. From
the military-run executive branch
to senior officials in the national
security regime, Mubarak’s men
still call the shots. Senior judicial appointments to Egypt’s high
courts are suspected of rulings
that are inappropriately lenient
toward former cabinet members.4
And despite a legitimate parliamentary election process, the military seized back legislative
authority after the Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved parliament. Meanwhile, legal challenges to the military’s flagrant
power grab are quickly dismissed by a judiciary that is increasingly perceived as partial to the military.5

Even when parliament
existed, the Constitutional
Declaration did not clarify parliament’s governing authority
viz-a-viz the executive branch.
Article 141 of the provisional
constitution grants the President
the power to appoint the Prime
Minister from within the ranks
of the political party holding
the most parliamentary seats.
However, this article also allows the President to sack the
Prime Minister from office without parliament’s approval.
Article 76 of the Interim Constitutional Declaration does not
permit appeals of rulings by the presidential elections commission on election disputes, jeopardizing the legitimacy of the
presidential elections as those alleging fraud and voting irregularities are denied a neutral and impartial review. Just as problematic
is the SCAF’s removal of the 64-member parliamentary quota
for women, thereby decreasing female representation in the
People’s Assembly from twelve percent (64 members) to less
than two percent (12 members, three of which were appointed by
the SCAF).9 Finally, the same police and internal security forces
that abused tens of thousands of Egyptians during the revolution
remain intact eighteen months later.

The now-dissolved parliament — dominated by the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafi’s Nour
party6 — once served as the sole bulwark against other sections
of the military-controlled government. But it proved to be a
rambunctious, disheveled, and ineffective bunch, and the few
bills it managed to pass could not become law without SCAF’s
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These legal shortcomings, among others, contribute to a
continued sense of instability among a majority of Egyptians.
Ironically, it is the same instability initiated by remnants of
the Mubarak regime that bootstraps them back into political office. Former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq’s victory
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in the first round of the presidential elecThe Post-Mubarak Political
tions was due to a populace disappointed in
Backdrop and Key Political Actors
the revolutionaries who they deemed incaFive pre-revolutionary factors have shaped
pable of delivering the goals of the revothe reality of Egypt’s current political turmoil.
lution — stability, dignity, and prosperity.
First, the Egyptian military has had de facto
Indeed, Shafiq’s campaign motto promised
control of the executive and legislative branch
to bring back the stability that allegedly selfsince the army overthrew the British-backed
indulgent and rabble-rousing revolutionarKing Farouk in 1952.13 Second, the Muslim
ies eliminated at the expense of ordinary
Brotherhood, despite being officially banned,
Egyptians.10 In addition, Shafiq’s viability as a
has gained popularity over the past few decades
candidate was a result of the quick remobilizadue to a general rise in religiosity and political
tion of the National Democratic Party’s (NDP)
Islam in the Middle East. Third, Saudi Arabia
leadership.11 The NDP had lay tactically dorand other Gulf countries have actively sought to
mant in the first twelve months of the revolu- Photo courtesy of Egyptian American
nudge Egypt out of its historic regional leadertion only to later re-emerge and prove correct Rule of Law Association.
ship role. They have used significant investments
fears the Mubarak-era political apparatus is far
in the Egyptian economy to leverage influence in
from eliminated. Thus, whatever progress achieved by reformers
Egyptian society through various means. The most obvious manisince Mubarak’s overthrow is quickly being undermined by
festation of these efforts is the growing Salafi movement in Egypt,
counter-revolutionaries and the military.
which is notorious for adopting stringently literalist interpretations
of the Quran. Fourth, the rate of poverty has risen at an alarming
rate while a select cadre of Egyptians flaunts its corruptly acquired
wealth.14 The rapidly increasing gap between the poor and the rich
coupled with the near extinction of the middle class was a veritable
powderkeg. Finally and often overlooked, is the deeply seated
classism that dominates Egyptian culture. Higher-rung Egyptians’
elitist allergic reactions to lower socio-economic classes impede
egalitarian reforms necessary for a vigorous democratic system.
The liberal and revolutionaries’ failure to win votes in rural and
urban poor electorates is a testament to this.15

Against this political backdrop, this essay argues Egypt
is still in the midst of a revolution and has yet to enter the
post-revolutionary phase of nation-building. The essay starts
by providing a brief summary of the political context of the
post-Mubarak transition. Central to understanding the context is
identifying the key political actors and their roles in the ongoing
struggle to reshape Egypt’s political landscape. Finally, this
essay highlights the importance of the rule of law to steer Egypt
through an inevitably turbulent phase at this historic juncture.
In many ways, the heated contestation for power is a healthy indicator of Egyptians’ investment in their nation in stark contrast to
the pre-revolution sense of hopeless complacency. But such contestations can be politically debilitating if they are not constrained
by laws that ensure a fair and level playing field among the various political actors, allow the citizenry to hold elected officials
accountable for failing to improve the economy, and guarantee no
one — not even a President, as evidenced by the recent criminal
trial of Mubarak12 — is above the law. Without rule of law, however, the citizenry will again disengage from the political system
as it discovers its votes and voices are irrelevant to the broader
power struggle between the military and Muslim Brotherhood.

The January 25 revolution was a significant blow to a deeply
entrenched patronage system wherein the military monopolized
power under a civilian guise of the National Democratic Party
(NDP). Former military officials manipulated NDP leadership
positions to curry the loyalty of the non-military business elite
through corrupt land deals, heavily discounted raw materials, and
valuable exclusive product distribution contracts. So long as the
NDP was willing to line the business elite’s pockets, the latter was
willing to cede political power to it. Thus, when the revolutionaries
demanded the fall of the Mubarak regime, the interests of the otherwise apolitical business elite were directly threatened, leading to
a well-financed counter-revolution that continues to the present day.

In perspective, Egypt’s experience could have turned out
much worse compared to other nations undergoing revolutions
(see: Syria). However, that alone does not curtail Egyptians’ wellgrounded demands of a government at the service of the people
and not the other way around. Until leaders who are entirely
separate from the former regime and its entrenched interests are
elected, the people will not see the goals of the revolution realized.

Although a nominally civilian government controlled Egypt,
every president since the 1952 overthrow of the British-backed
King Farouk was a former military leader. In turn, those presidents appointed trusted military colleagues to head key ministries and public companies, ensuring firm military control over
the country. As a result, the military manages a shadow economy
that comprises approximately 40% of Egypt’s overall economy.16
Much like in preceding administrations, the military under the
Mubarak government ran a shadow economy free of taxes,
duties, and accountability that rendered impossible any attempt
to understand its operations, budgets, and profits. These hefty
financial stakes explain much of the military’s intransigence in
transferring control of domestic affairs to a civilian government.

“… the military appears to
genuinely hold a self-righteous
savior persona developed
during the revolution.”

But beyond its financial stakes, the military appears to genuinely
hold a self-righteous savior persona developed during the revolution. It believes tens of thousands of Egyptians would have
been murdered had it not refused to defy the former President’s
3
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Brotherhood’s
social
order of shooting protestors.
As such, the silencing of its
agenda distasteful to their
guns has not silenced SCAF’s
unique cultural combinasanctimonious view of itself
tion of piety, tolerance,
as the benevolent patriarch
and humor.22 Thus, when
without whom the country
it came time to vote in
would fall apart. However,
Egypt’s first free parliaits numerous missteps over
mentary elections, many
the course of the last eighurban voters were conteen months demonstrate its
flicted between voting for
inability to govern a nation
an untested Islamist party
of 85 million people, 25
and a directionless amalNo to dissolution of the parliament. Photo courtesy of Sahar Aziz.
percent of whom live at
gamation of liberal revothe poverty line at $44 per
lutionaries. In the end, the
month and 5 percent living on less.17
Brotherhood attained enough urban poor votes to supplement its
popularity in the rural areas.
Also worth noting is the Egyptian military’s strong ties to the
United States military, from which it annually receives $1.3 bilBut the Muslim Brotherhood’s initial electoral success in the
lion in aid and training.18 In considering American interests, the
2011 parliamentary elections suffered a significant setback. Every
worst outcome of the revolution is an Islamist-controlled Egypt
promise of disinterest in dominating the legislative and executive
that may not be as compliant with American prerogatives in the
branches was matched with a flagrant power grab. For instance,
Middle East. For these reasons, among others, the military will
the Brotherhood initially proclaimed it would seek only thirty percontinue to have significant influence in Egyptian politics.
cent of the now-defunct People’s Assembly. Yet, it ran for seventy
percent of the seats and won fifty percent in the lower house of
Looming in the shadows is the Muslim Brotherhood’s forparliament.23 Combined with the twenty-five percent of seats Salafi
midable influence in the countryside and parts of Alexandria.19
candidates won — many of whom the Brotherhood endorsed — the
Despite being officially banned from politics for decades, the
lower house was firmly in the hands of Islamist parties. Similarly,
Brotherhood capitalized on the central government’s neglect of
the Brotherhood promised not to run a presidential candidate. But
the rural areas and the urban poor by providing much needed
no sooner had it made the promise did it run two consecutive cansocial services.20 Its immediate success following the revolution,
didates — Khairat Al Shater who was disqualified and Mohammed
both in the streets and in parliament, appeared eerily calculated
Morsi who ultimately won.24 This duplicity significantly eroded the
such that some Egyptians suspected the Brotherhood of orchesBrotherhood’s credibility such that it went from receiving fifty pertrating the 2011 revolution. Indeed, the Brotherhood’s desire
cent of the votes in the parliamentary elections to only twenty-five
for political power was no secret. Despite being banned as a
percent in the first round of the presidential elections.
political party, it doggedly sought representation in the People’s
Assembly by running its candidates in the limited seats allocated
A significant mitigating force to the Brotherhood’s sudden rise
for independent candidates.21
to power and the counter-revolutionaries’ success is the maturation of the Egyptian human rights community. Although a number
To many city dwellers, the Muslim Brotherhood was too
of reputable human rights organizations date back to the 1990s,
dogmatic for their sensibilities. Such perceptions were due
including the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR),
in large part to Mubarak’s successful public defamation camAl Nadeem Center Against Torture, the Arab Network for Human
paigns portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as inflexible,
Rights Information (ANHRI) and the Hisham Mubarak Center
religious zealots bent on forcibly transforming Egypt’s tolerant
(HMC),25 the human rights community expanded and started
society into a Saudi-like theocracy. Known for their pious but
coming of age in the early 2000s. Around that time, a number of
moderate interpretations of Islam, Egyptians found the
highly effective organizations were founded that currently serve
as staunch watchdogs over government abuse. For example, the
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), founded in 2002,
was the first to prioritize defending individual rights including
the long-neglected Baha’i and gay communities.26 Two years
later in 2004, the New Woman Foundation, which began as an
informal study group, formalized its activities into an institution
that incorporated gender rights issues into the broader democracy movement taking root in Egypt.27 In 2006, the Association
for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) was created to
defend freedom of expression and combat state censorship of public discourse and academia.28 Around the same time, the Egyptian
Democracy Academy (EDA) was established to train youth in
democracy promotion and grassroots activism.

“But the growth of Egypt’s
human rights community
came at a heavy price. The
Mubarak regime used every
tool in its arsenal to destroy
the human rights movement.”

But the growth of Egypt’s human rights community came at
a heavy price. The Mubarak regime used every tool in its arsenal
4
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revolution. For those reasons, any analysis of Egypt’s political
environment must take into account the human rights community’s role.

to destroy the human rights movement. Over the course of the
past twenty years, thousands of activists have been arrested,
detained, tortured, and prosecuted. An indefinite emergency
anti-terrorism law authorized the government to deny detainees
the most basic civil and human rights under the auspices of
national security.29 The law’s loose definition of the term “terrorism” gave the government room to surveil, torture, and hold
in incommunicado detention even peaceful critics of the government. The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) registration
law was manipulated to strip existing organizations of their
registration, deny the application of new organizations, and deny
them foreign funding.30 By placing activists outside the law, the
government was more easily able to portray them as saboteurs
to justify their harsh treatment. Mubarak also set up government non-government organizations, referred to as GNGOs, to
discredit independent organizations.31 The GNGOs produced
purportedly independent research that legitimized government
policies and depicted the Mubarak regime as a benevolent caretaker of the country.

Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, are another set of
actors attempting to influence the outcome of Egypt’s revolution. A telling illustration of the Gulf countries’ distress is their
moniker of the Arab Spring as “the Crisis.”35 To the ruling
monarchs of the Persian Gulf, the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt,
and Yemen set ominous threats to their own survival. Indeed,
their first response to the uprisings was to double the salaries
of all government employees in hopes of diffusing economic
grievances.36 Because Egypt has historically lead the region in
transformational political movements, as evinced by the spread
of pan-Arab Nasserism in the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia
does not want to see a successful secular, democratic state take
root in Egypt. It would only be a matter of time before Saudi
citizens seek to emulate their Egyptian counterparts, leaving
the government unable to discredit demands for democracy as a
seditious Western innovation.

For unsuspecting Egyptians, the GNGOs’ reports corroborated conspiracy theories of malicious foreign meddling in
Egyptian affairs through the nonprofit sector. The former regime
successfully discredited human rights organizations as representative of elite Egyptians who were out of touch with the average
Egyptian. By exploiting preexisting class grievances, Mubarak
deterred many Egyptians from associating with organizations
whose political reform agenda could have solved economic
woes. Even if Egyptians willfully sought assistance from foreign
NGOs, they could not do so freely. Under a watchful governmental eye, they were legally required to first seek permission
from the government to associate with NGOs or risk imprisonment.32 Furthermore, the former regime made the situation difficult for NGOs to operate, stalling registration applications for
years, then interfering in their activities. The military continued
this practice after Mubarak was removed from power.

Accordingly, Gulf countries have an interest in preventing
the democratic aspirations underpinning Egypt’s revolution from
coming to fruition. Saudi Arabia and Qatar poured millions of
dollars into Islamist parties during elections and currently grant
billions in foreign aid to secure their influence over Egypt’s
political future.37 Not only does an Islamist state decrease the
risk of a revolution in Saudi Arabia, but it also provides fertile
ground to proselytize their literalist interpretations of Islam,
which thus far has been rejected by the majority of Egyptians.
Certainly not to be dismissed is the role of the United States.
America’s interest in keeping Egypt as an ally is no secret. As the
most populous country in the Middle East with a shared border
with Israel, America’s most valued ally, the United States will
not stand by as its influence in Egypt wanes. Arguably, the U.S.
government is adopting the same strategy as Saudi Arabia but
for its support of liberal groups instead of Islamists. Hundreds
of millions of dollars poured into liberal political groups and
civil society organizations under the auspices of democracy
promotion projects are suspected as aimed to offset any success
of the Islamist parties — who are unlikely to be as compliant to
American directives as the Mubarak regime.38

Despite the military’s smear campaigns and fear tactics, the
human rights community flourished.33 As more Egyptian youth
became disaffected by the lack of employment, the deteriorating education system, and harsh policing tactics,34 calls for
basic rights amplified. The maturation of Egypt’s human rights
community from ideas to effectual institutions with budgets,
staff, and strategic agendas responsive to legitimate economic
and political grievances was a fundamental prerequisite for the

But the democracy development aid is paltry compared to
the $1.3 billion paid to the Egyptian military in exchange for its
support of American interests in the Middle
East. The U.S.’s continuation of financial
support to the military, notwithstanding its
blatant human rights abuses in violation of
Congressional conditions on aid, exposes
America’s political hedging.39 While the
military is the preferred domestic ally, the
United States has had to come to terms
with the reality that supporting dictators is
not sustainable. No longer can tens of millions of Egyptians complacently live near or
below the poverty rates while a select few
unjustly enrich themselves by syphoning off
state resources. Thus, the Obama administration has made multiple overtures to work
Egyptian women protesting. Photo courtesy of Egyptian American Rule of Law Association.
with the Muslim Brotherhood and its newly
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“Coined as the “revolutionary youth,” millions
of young people of different political persuasions
bucked tradition by refusing the older generation’s
monopoly over political power.”
elected president despite heated domestic opposition. While a
political realignment is inevitable in Egypt, the United States
will continue to be a key player in Egyptian politics.

violence against women has become a wedge issue manipulated
by the military to decrease the number of revolutionaries.
Still, eighteen months after the start of the revolution, much
has changed in Egypt. For the first time in their lives, millions
of Egyptians voted in parliamentary and presidential elections.45
The importance of this lies not so much in the action of voting
but rather Egyptians’ newfound trust in the relevance of their
votes. In March 2011, Egyptians across socioeconomic lines
actively debated whether they should draft a new constitution
before or after electing a parliament. New voices that moderated
lively debates among candidates quickly replaced television
pundits puppeted by the Mubarak regime. Diverse viewpoints
on various TV channels, newspapers, and opposition media subsumed once dominant state-sponsored media. The consequent
political energy has been palpable notwithstanding the bumpy
transition process.

So Much Has Changed, Yet Much Remains the Same
There is no doubt Egypt was forever changed on January
25, 2011. The seal of fear deeply rooted in the Egyptian psyche
was broken, releasing decades of pent-up deprivation. For those
familiar with Egypt, witnessing millions of Egyptians taking to
the streets, stridently demanding the fall of the regime was nothing short of surreal. Although a revolution seemed imminent
every year as economic conditions in Egypt rapidly deteriorated,
Egyptians seemed cursed with a bottomless tolerance for suffering. Fortunately for the country’s future, the generation of youth
whose futures had been sabotaged by a corrupt and tyrannical
regime took the fateful steps into Tahrir (“Liberation”) Square.

Another new development is the empowerment of Egyptian
youth in an otherwise patriarchal system that once simply
dismissed their grievances. Coined as the “revolutionary youth,”
millions of young people of different political persuasions
bucked tradition by refusing the older generation’s monopoly
over political power. This assortment of economically diverse
and politically inexperienced young people had worn the yoke
of governmental oppression for far too long. In a combined
front, they demanded justice, fairness, accountability, the rule
of law, and political, civil, and human rights. Despite its leaderless and seemingly rudderless revolutionary fervor, the group’s
persistent return to Tahrir Square, the symbolic heart of the
revolution, each time the military overreaches has transformed
it into a potent political force. Magnifying its efficacy, the
younger generation’s mastery of the latest social media technology permits the group to quickly share information, monitor
government wrongdoing, and mobilize back to “the Square”
even after repeated expulsions. Tenacity appears to make up
for the revolutionary youth’s small numbers compared to the
Muslim Brotherhood’s large following and the former regime’s
lurking counter-revolutionaries.

For the first ten months of the revolution up until the new
parliament took office, the military responded to the protesters
in much the same way as its friend and former benefactor,
Mubarak. It exercised broad authorities under emergency law,
herded hundreds of protestors into military courts where they
had no due process rights, tortured detainees by the thousands,
and shut down nonprofit organizations that challenged its practices.40
If any of those abusive tactics failed, it warned the people of a foreignborn, invisible hand that prompted the protestors to create chaos.
In addition to these familiar tactics, the military desperately
adopted even more aggressive tactics to offset its waning legitimacy. Women protesters became targets of assault and sexual
harassment by the police and counter-revolutionaries.41 Military
officers coercively performed virginity tests on female detainees,
cognizant this form of torture is the most psychologically
humiliating in a socially conservative Muslim country.42 This
strong-armed control measure had the effect as well, to warn
other women to stay home. When confronted on television about
such practices, military officers dismissed their victims as loose
women who “were not like our girls at home.”43 It was a message to all fathers, husbands, and brothers to keep their women
home lest they be corrupted by these promiscuous female
protesters and ultimately be similarly treated when captured.
More distressing is the fact women were sexually assaulted at a
troubling rate. The reported cases were just the tip of the iceberg
of the actual number of women who paid a heavy price for their
attempts to oust the military regime. Ironically, while protesting
the sexual assaults, women were accused of destabilizing the
country and subsequently attacked by a mob of thugs.44 Public

Not to be overlooked, despite existing risks to their lives and
well-being, are the fearless revolutionary women who demand
a transformational change in Egypt’s political system. Although
the number of women who repeatedly protest in Tahrir is
relatively small, a substantial percentage of women has gone
to the streets at least once over the course of the last eighteen
months. For a society that has traditionally demarcated politics
to men because it was considered too dangerous or unbecoming
6
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for women, Egyptian women’s fiercely visible participation in
each phase of the protracted revolution evinces a significant
shift in gender relations. In addition, women in most households
are actively debating the latest political issues irrespective of
their participation in the protests.46 That said, Egyptian women
have yet to attain their due access in ongoing political decision
making bodies.

state of affairs that’s anathema to stability-obsessed Egyptians.
the more the public viewed revolutionaries as low-class thugs
and troublemakers generating more instability, the more secure
the military’s power. And because the military is an extension
of the Mubarak regime, its retention of power renders
the Egyptian revolution as an illegitimate coup de'état, not
a grassroots revolution.

Despite all of these changes, much remains the same.
The military continues Mubarak-era practices that violate
human rights, but at a rate far surpassing Mubarak’s flagrant
record. Under a cover of impunity afforded by the former
regime’s emergency laws, the military has tried more than
twelve thousand civilians47 in military courts where officers
swiftly convicted and sentenced defendants to years in prison
without providing due process rights.48 The military refused
to repeal the emergency law after the revolution and kept
pointing to ongoing protests to justify the law’s importance.
It was not until June 4, 2012, during a heated presidential
run-off election, the three decades-old law finally expired.49
But in its place, other national security laws, some passed after
the revolution, continue to authorize the military to engage in the
same human rights violations under the color of law. As a result,
thousands of protesters have been tortured by the military with
no legal recourse. Well-known activists, such as Maikal Nabil
Sanad and Asma Mahfouz, were prosecuted in military courts
and sentenced to jail to set an example.50 Only after intense
lobbying by American policy makers and internationally
connected Egyptian advocates were the sentences overturned.

Anchoring Democracy Through Rule of Law
A potent solution to the unpredictable and disorderly
situation is for Egyptians to strengthen the rule of law.55 Notably,
Egypt has one of the most sophisticated legal systems in the
Middle East, borne of an amalgamation of Islamic, British,
and French law.56 An aggravating effect of this complexity is
the overwhelming caseloads burdening judges who work in an
underfunded judicial administration system. An abundance of
procedural delay mechanisms allows crafty lawyers to postpone
resolution for decades.57 Litigants seeking to resolve their disputes may find themselves in their deathbeds by the time their
case makes its way through the convoluted appeals process. For
these reasons and others, the Egyptian legal system fails to meet
the needs of the business community and the citizenry at large.58
In addition to an increased investment in the judicial infrastructure, technology, staff training, and other needs of an effective
judicial system,59 a cultural shift must occur. Over the past sixty
years, the law has been manipulated by the powerful to retain
their power and enrich themselves at the expense of the average Egyptian. Rule by law, not rule of law, has been the norm
in Egypt. Rule by law allows government officials to manipulate laws to concentrate and further entrench their power while
eliminating political opposition.
In contrast, rule of law ensures
no one is above the law, all citizens are treated equally before
the law, adjudicators of disputes
are independent and objective,
and legitimate grievances can be
redressed without destabilizing
mass protests.60

Other new laws were also unilaterally passed by the military
to assume legislative and executive powers. Individuals were
prosecuted for “insulting the
army” as a direct affront to the
freedom of speech and expression.51 Journalists were arrested
for reporting on issues the army
deemed defamatory.52 A notorious “thuggery law” was passed
under the auspices of returning
law and order after a series of
violent episodes between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries.53 By indicting revolutionary youth for thuggery,
the military publicly disparaged
them as hooligans seeking to
destabilize the country rather
than liberate it. In the end, the
thuggery law gave the military
a tighter grip over the political
situation and also allowed it to delegitimize protestors to millions of Egyptians sitting on their couches, watching television
trying to make sense of the situation. Known as “hizb al kanaba”
(figuratively The Couch Party), they represent the silent majority whose opinions are swayed by daily events and whose numbers far outweigh those who regularly protest in Tahrir Square.54
State media also portrayed the revolutionary youth and liberal
leaning activists as saboteurs who created “fawda” or chaos — a

“Despite all of these
changes, much remains the
same. The military continues
Mubarak-era practices that
violate human rights, but
at a rate far surpassing
Mubarak’s flagrant record.”

As a result, few Egyptians
have faith in the Egyptian legal
system.61 Such skepticism is
most glaring in the numerous
protests challenging rulings perceived as too lenient, in cases
against former Mubarak officials.62 Egyptians questioned
the judges’ impartiality and concluded the entire process was a farce. The distrust in the judicial
and legal system was crystallized with the Supreme Constitutional
Court’s recent dissolution of parliament — a move widely interpreted as a declawing of the Muslim Brotherhood’s majority
control of parliament and an avenue through which the military
assumed legislative powers.63 The Court’s move was also arguably a political slap on the face to a parliament that was rumored
to have debated eradicating the Supreme Constitutional Court
altogether64 or interfering in the promotion system of judges.65
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are affiliated with the former Mubarak regime, can abuse
them to imprison the opposition.
Relatedly, laws that whisk citizens out of the criminal
justice context and into a national security context, where
due process rights are nonexistent, must be eliminated.
Although Mubarak’s notorious emergency law expired on
June 4, 2012, other laws grant prosecutors the authority to
arbitrarily deem a defendant a threat to national security. For
example, SCAF can still detain these defendants under the
Code of Military Justice and try them in a military tribunal.67
One especially important law that needs to be passed is
a freedom of information law. Much of Egypt’s unchecked
corruption can be attributed to the absence of an effective legal
mechanism for journalists, lawyers, and citizens to monitor
government activities and ensure accountability.68 Over
the past few decades alone, corrupt, greasy-palmed politicians have robbed the Egyptian treasury of billions of
Egyptian pounds, only to be discovered years later, if at all,
long after the money fleeted into foreign bank accounts.69
All of this occurred under the blanket of secrecy afforded
by the absence of transparency laws. Robust freedom of information laws empower investigative journalists and watchdog
groups to ferret out corruption in time to hold rule breakers
responsible, serving as a powerful deterrent to future fraud.
Because most Egyptians of all political stripes agree corruption
is a pervasive problem,70 a freedom of information law is a politically palatable measure of reform that should be a priority in the
new parliament’s agenda. Many other legal reforms, including
free press and fair labor laws, are
needed to transform Egypt into a
prosperous nation that leverages
its human capital and other
national resources. In the end,
a sustainable democracy cannot exist without a solid rule of
law foundation. 71

Revolutionary graffiti. Photo courtesy of Sahar Aziz.

Court rulings finding unconstitutional the new law disqualifying
former cabinet officials from political office, including Ahmed
Shafiq, further delegitimized the courts.66 This credibility deficit will not disappear overnight. It can only be reversed through
a concerted effort to eliminate the rule by law mentality held
by most politicians irrespective of their political affiliations.
Just as integral to the transition to rule of law is the consistent
and impartial enforcement of laws. In many instances, Egyptian
laws comply with international law and best practices. However,
if those laws conflict with the
ruling party’s interests, then
enforcement is nearly nonexistent.
Thus, a legal reform agenda must
focus on enforcement in addition
to reforming substantive laws.

“Significant conflicting
financial and political
interests are at stake,
making Egypt’s revolution
an inevitably protracted
process. Part of this painful
but necessary process is a
shift from a system of rule
by law to rule of law.”

There is no shortage of laws
in need of significant improvement. In light of authoritarian
abuses highlighted here, numerous articles in the penal code
must either be repealed altogether or amended to narrow
the circumstances in which a
violation of law is found. For
example, Article 184 of the Penal
Code prohibits insulting the military establishment or parliament
and Article 102 prohibits spreading false information. Articles
179, 182, and 185 criminalize
insulting the president, public
officials, foreign heads of state,
and foreign diplomats. Each of
these provisions directly infringe
on freedom of speech and expression, a fundamental attribute of
a functioning democratic society. Such provisions are also most
often too easily enforced to silence opposition. So long as these
laws remain in effect, new political leaders whether or not they

Conclusion

Egypt stands at a crossroads
between merely replacing one set
of corrupt leaders with another
or completely transforming its
political system to create a nation
governed by and accountable to
its citizens. While the revolutionary youth have clearly communicated their demands for the latter,
strong countervailing forces are
using every tool in their arsenal
to preserve the pre-revolution
system. Significant conflicting
financial and political interests
are at stake, making Egypt’s revolution an inevitably protracted process. Part of this painful but
necessary process is a shift from a system of rule by law to rule of
law. No one, no matter how powerful, rich, or influential should
be above the law. And every elected official, no matter how high
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up, should be accountable to the electorate. Facts on the ground
show this transformation does not occur without significant
sacrifices both in terms of lives and livelihoods. But if the
ultimate outcome is a more democratic, prosperous, and stable

country, then the long wait is worthwhile. After centuries of
authoritarianism by foreign occupiers, kings, and military rulers,
Egyptians need and deserve to finally rule themselves.
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